Optimal annuitization, uncertain survival probabilities, and maxmin preferences by D'Albis, Hippolyte & Thibault, Emmanuel
Optimal Annuitization, Uncertain Survival
Probabilities and Maxmin Preferences
Hippolyte d’ALBIS∗
Paris School of Economics (University Paris 1)
Emmanuel THIBAULT
Toulouse School of Economics (University of Perpignan, CDED and IDEI)
Abstract: We consider a life-cycle model with bequest motives and assume that the
individual does not know her survival probability and has maxmin utility preferences;
we show it is optimal not to annuitize but to purchase pure life insurance policies
instead.
Keywords: Demand for Annuities, Uncertain Survival Probabilities, Uncertainty
Aversion, Maxmin.
JEL codes: D11, D81, G11, G22.
∗Corresponding Author. H. d’Albis, CES, 106 boulevard de l’Hopital, 75013 Paris, France. Phone:
33 1 44 07 81 99. Fax: 33 1 44 07 82 31. Email: dalbis@univ-paris1.fr
1 Introduction
Only a small fraction of people opt for voluntary annuitization. Such observations are
at odds with the life-cycle model of consumption with uncertain lifetime proposed by
Yaari (1965). Full annuitization should indeed be the optimal strategy followed by
an individual without altruistic motives provided that annuities are available. The
initial framework has hence been extended and many partial explanations of the so-
called annuity market participation puzzle have been proposed. However, as shown by
Davidoff et al. (2005), positive annuitization still remains optimal under very general
specifications and assumptions, including intergenerational altruism. In this paper, we
study a life-cycle model similar to that of Yaari (1965) and Davidoff et al. (2005),
while restricting ourselves to the case of warm-glow altruism. We consider a maxmin
utility problem within a framework with state-dependent utilities yielded by uncertain
lifetimes. In this simple framework, we show it is optimal not to annuitize, even for
large returns of annuities and a low degree of intergenerational altruism.
2 Basic Framework
We consider a two-period model of consumption and bequest with uncertain lifetime
similar to that of Davidoff et al. (2005). The length of life spans two periods at
the most, with the second one being uncertain. The individual derives utility from
consumption and a bequest that she might leave at the end of period 1 or 2. In the
first period, the individual is endowed with a non negative initial income Ω that can
be shared between bonds and annuities. Bonds return RB > 0 units of consumption
in period 2, whether the individual is alive or not, in exchange for each unit of the
initial endowment. Conversely, annuities return RA > RB in period 2 if the individual
is alive and nothing otherwise. Due to the possibility of dying, the demand for bonds
should be non-negative and therefore annuities are the only way to borrow (this selling
of annuities is a purchase of pure life insurance policies). If the individual is alive
during the second period, she may allocate her financial wealth between consumption
and bequest. Since death is certain at the end of period 2, the latter corresponds
exclusively to a demand for bonds.
Let c1, A and B respectively denote the consumption, the demand for annuities
and the demand for bonds in the first period, and let c2 and x respectively denote
the consumption and the bequest decided upon in the second period. The budget
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constraints can be written as follows:
c1 = Ω− A− B, (1)
c2 = RAA+RBB − x. (2)
In addition, the following inequalities hold:
c1 ≥ 0, c2 ≥ 0, x ≥ 0, B ≥ 0. (3)
Using the budget constraints, these inequalities imply that the demand for annuities
is bounded and may be negative:
−
RB
RA −RB
Ω ≤ A ≤ Ω. (4)
In accordance with Davidoff et al. (2005), we assume that whatever the length of
the individual’s life, bequests are received in period 3, involving additional interest:
the bequest is therefore RBx if the individual is alive in period 2, while it is R
2
BB if
she is not.
Finally, the individual’s utility is u (c1)+w (c2)+v (RBx) if she lives for two periods
and u (c1) + v (R
2
BB) if she lives for only one period. Functions u (.), w (.) and v (.)
are supposed to be positive, increasing, concave and to possess an infinite slope at zero
and a horizontal slope at infinity. Additive separability is not a key assumption and
our results still hold with more general functions.
3 Optimal Annuitization and Maxmin Utility
In what follows, the individual is assumed to be in complete ignorance about her
survival probability, which may take any value between 0 and 1. Moreover, she employs
the Wald (1950) decision criterion, the so-called maxmin utility criterion. She behaves
so as to maximize utility from among the worst possible utilities. In our case, there
are two possible states of nature, namely being alive or not during the second period,
but since utility increases with a bequest, the worst state is not given a priori. The
individual hence solves:
max
c1,c2,x,B
min
(
u (c1) + w (c2) + v (RBx) , u (c1) + v
(
R2BB
))
(5)
subject to (1), (2) and (3).
Let (c∗
1
, c∗
2
, x∗, A∗, B∗) be the optimal solution of the problem. The following two
propositions characterize this solution.
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Proposition 1 .
The optimal behavior is to make welfare independent of the length of life by equaliz-
ing the utilities derived in the two states of nature, which implies: w (c∗
2
) + v (RBx
∗) =
v (R2BB
∗). Consequently, the second-period consumption is greater than annuitization:
c∗
2
> RAA
∗.
Proof – See Appendix A. 
The presence of a bequest motive implies that the utility obtained if death occurs
at the end of the first period is not systematically lower than if it occurs one period
later. By modifying the relative share of bonds and annuities in the portfolio, both
cases are, in actual fact, possible. In Proposition 1, we suggest that the solution of
the maxmin problem is to make welfare independent of the lottery i.e., in our case,
independent of the length of life. The intuition for this result is explained as follows.
Suppose, by contradiction, that utility is greater if the individual lives for two periods.
The individual then aims to maximize the utility obtained in the event of early death,
which is achieved by selling the highest possible, indeed an infinite number of annuities
in order to purchase a maximum number of bonds. In this case, however, the utility
in the event of early death is infinite and greater than in the event of late death.
Suppose, conversely, that the utility is greater if the individual lives for one period.
The individual then aims to maximize the utility obtained in the event of late death.
Since annuities return more than bonds, it would therefore be optimal not to hold
bonds in her portfolio. The bequest in the event of early death is therefore zero, and
the utility with one period of life cannot be greater than with two periods.
To summarize, with a maxmin utility criterion, the optimal behavior is to avoid the
lottery by ensuring the same utility whatever the length of life. As a consequence, the
utility derived from both consumption and bequest, obtained in the event of survival,
should be made equal to the utility derived from the bequest only in the event of early
death. The bequest in the latter case should then be larger than in the former, which,
using the budget constraint (2), implies that second-period consumption exceeds annu-
itization. Contrary to the expected utility case studied by Yaari (1965), the individual
consumes some of her bonds if she survives and thus, a zero annuitization strategy
is possible. We note that this result is true for any returns on annuities and bonds
provided that RA > RB.
Proposition 2 .
The optimal strategy is to sell annuities short: A∗ < 0.
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Proof – See Appendix B. 
With a maxmin utility criterion, the individual should not purchase annuities but
sell them short, or, equivalently, purchase pure life insurance policies (Bernheim, 1991).
Proposition 2 claims that the selling of annuities is the only way to sufficiently reduce
consumption and bequest in the second period in order to equalize utilities in the two
states of nature. To understand this result, let us figure out what would happen if
the utility were independent of consumption. Equalizing the utilities in the two states
of nature would then be obtained by equalizing the bequests. Since annuities return
more than bonds, the optimal portfolio should be exclusively composed of bonds: the
demand for annuities would thus be zero. Our model is more complex as utilities are
state-dependent. If the individual is alive in the second period, she benefits from her
consumption, which should be compensated by a higher utility if she were not alive;
this is achieved through the selling of annuities.
Our framework can be considered as an extreme case when dealing with the demand
for annuities. In the next section, we extend our results to a more general case for which
the values that may be taken by the unknown survival probability do not necessarily
include 0 and 1.
4 Extension to Maxmin Expected Utility
In this section, we assume that the individual is still unaware of both her survival
probability and its distribution but that she does know the support of the latter. More
precisely, the survival probability, denoted by p, may take any value within the interval
[p0, p1], with 0 ≤ p0 < p1 ≤ 1. For each value of p, an expected utility may then be
computed. We assume that the individual employs a maxmin expected utility criterion
(Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). Her problem can be written as follows:
max
c1,c2,x,B
min
p
u (c1) + p [w (c2) + v (RBx)] + (1− p) v
(
R2BB
)
, (6)
subject to the same constraints as in the previous section, namely (1), (2) and (3).
We note that the problem studied in the previous section is a special case of this
one. Moreover, in order to equalize the expected utilities in each state of nature (i.e.
for each possible value of the survival probability) it is necessary to make the welfare
independent of longevity, as stated in Proposition 1. In this case, Proposition 2 holds.
In the following proposition, we give a sufficient condition under which such a behavior
is still optimal.
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Proposition 3 .
There exists pˆ0 ∈ (0, RB/RA), such that if p0 < pˆ0, the optimal strategy is to sell
annuities short: A∗ < 0.
Proof – See Appendix C. 
The main result we obtain in Proposition 2 is hence extended to a maxmin expected
utility framework provided that the lowest possible value of the uncertain survival
probability is not too large. If p0 is sufficiently low, the individual sells annuities short.
Conversely, if p0 is high enough, the worst state of nature may be the expected utility
computed at p0. Then, maximizing the latter objective may lead to a positive demand
for annuities.
Let us point out that the annuitization decision is made by the elderly who face
relatively low average survival probabilities and, consequently, even lower p0. At first
glance, the condition p0 < pˆ0 is thus realistic.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have provided a simple framework in which rational individuals do
not annuitize. More precisely, we show that the optimal strategy is to sell annuities
short, or to purchase pure life insurance policies. Our result hinges on two crucial
assumptions, namely that individuals are unaware of their own survival probability
and that they display aversion toward this uncertainty, and on one condition, which is
that the lowest possible survival probability should be low enough. We have proved our
result using a maxmin expected utility framework, which features a rather extreme case
in terms of aversion to uncertainty. We conjecture that our results hold for sufficiently
strong aversion to uncertainty. It would nevertheless be interesting to study this last
point carefully.
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Appendix
Appendix A – Proof of Proposition 1.
We first note that the objective function (5) is equivalent to the following one:
max (φ (c1, c2, x, B) , ψ (c1, c2, x, B)) , (A.1)
where:
φ (c1, c2, x, B) = maxw (c2) + v (RBx)
s.t. v (R2BB)− w (c2)− v (RBx) ≥ 0,
(A.2)
ψ (c1, c2, x, B) = max v (R
2
BB)
s.t. w (c2) + v (RBx)− v (R
2
BB) ≥ 0.
(A.3)
The Lagrangians of problems (A.2) and (A.3) are respectively written as:
L1 = u (c1) + (1− µ) [w (c2) + v (RBx)] + µv
(
R2BB
)
, (A.4)
L2 = u (c1) + λ [w (c2) + v (RBx)] + (1− λ) v
(
R2BB
)
, (A.5)
where the multipliers associated with the inequality constraints are denoted by µ and
λ. As a consequence, λ = 1− µ, and the first-order conditions of our problem are:
−u′ (c1) + (1− µ)RARBv
′ (RBx) = 0, (A.6)
−u′ (c1) + (1− µ)R
2
Bv
′ (RBx) + µR
2
Bv
′
(
R2BB
)
= 0, (A.7)
(1− µ) [w′ (c2)−RBv
′ (RBx)] = 0, (A.8)
µ (1− µ)
[
w (c2) + v (RBx)− v
(
R2BB
)]
= 0. (A.9)
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We now prove the first part of Proposition 1 by showing that the multiplier µ cannot
be neither zero nor one. Let us first show that µ 6= 0. Using (A.6) and (A.7), µ = 0
is indeed impossible since RA > RB. Let us now show that µ 6= 1. Using (A.6) and
(A.7), µ = 1 would imply that c1 and B tend to +∞, because it has been assumed
that marginal utility is zero at infinity. Using (1), this implies that A tends to −∞.
Then, replacing (1) in (2) gives:
x+ c2 = (RA −RB)A+RB (Ω− c1) , (A.10)
from which we deduce that x + c2 tends to −∞. Hence, µ = 1 is impossible since the
inequalities in (3) cannot be satisfied.
Next, we prove the second part of Proposition 1 using (A.9) for µ /∈ {0, 1}. At the
optimal solution, we may write:
w (c∗
2
) + v (RBx
∗) = v
(
R2BB
∗
)
, (A.11)
which implies that x∗ < RBB
∗. Using (2) is finally sufficient to obtain the desired
conclusion. 
Appendix B – Proof of Proposition 2.
Let us compare the solution of problem (6), denoted (c∗
1
, c∗
2
, x∗, A∗, B∗), with the
feasible set (c∗
1
, c¯2, x¯, A
∗, B∗) where c¯2 = 0 and x¯ ≡ RAA
∗ + RBB
∗. Since w′ (0) = +∞
is assumed, the latter does not satisfy (A.8), and is therefore not optimal. We conclude
(using the assumption w (0) ≥ 0) that:
w (c∗
2
) + v (RBx
∗) > v
(
RBRAA
∗ +R2BB
∗
)
. (B.1)
Using Proposition 1, we obtain that v (R2BB
∗) > v (RBRAA
∗ +R2BB
∗), and conse-
quently that A∗ < 0. 
Appendix C – Proof of Proposition 3.
Let us first denote the solution of (6) by (c∗
1
, c∗
2
, x∗, A∗, B∗, p∗) and the expected
utility computed at the optimum by EU∗ that we may write:
EU∗ = u (c∗
1
) + p∗ [w (c∗
2
) + v (RBx
∗)] + (1− p∗) v
(
R2BB
∗
)
. (C.1)
The proof proceeds as follows. We assume that A∗ > 0, and show that there exists a
pˆ0 such that, for all p0 ≤ pˆ0, this is not possible. We conclude that A
∗ is negative for
all p0 < pˆ0.
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Let us consider the feasible set, denoted by
(
c¯1, c¯2, x¯, A¯, B¯, p¯
)
, which is such that
A¯ ∈ (0, A∗), p¯ = p∗, B¯ = B∗ and x¯ = RBB
∗. We hence obtain c¯2 = RAA¯ using (2),
and c¯1 > c
∗
1
using (1). Let EU denote the expected utility obtained by this set. Since,
by the definition of B¯ and x¯, w (c¯2) + v (RBx¯) > v
(
R2BB¯
)
, we have:
EU > u (c¯1) + v
(
R2BB¯
)
> u (c∗
1
) + v
(
R2BB
∗
)
. (C.2)
Moreover, by the definition of a maximum: EU∗ ≥ EU , from which we deduce that:
EU∗ > u (c∗
1
) + v
(
R2BB
∗
)
.
This implies that w (c∗
2
)+ v (RBx
∗) > v (R2BB
∗) and consequently that p∗ = p0. There-
fore, (c∗
1
, c∗
2
, x∗, A∗, B∗) should be the solution of the following problem:
max
c1,c2,x,B
u (c1) + p0 [w (c2) + v (RBx)] + (1− p0) v
(
R2BB
)
, (C.3)
subject to (1), (2) and (3).
However, it can be shown that the A solution of the latter problem is increas-
ing with p0, negative for p0 = 0 and positive for p0 = RB/RA. Then, there ex-
ists pˆ0 ∈ (0, RB/RA) such that for all p0 ≤ pˆ0, we have a contradiction between
(c∗
1
, c∗
2
, x∗, A∗, B∗, p∗) being optimal and A∗ > 0 being positive. We conclude that for
all p0 < pˆ0, the optimal demand is negative, i.e. A
∗ < 0. 
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